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RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS - PRODUCTS LIABILITY - THEORY OF STRICT TORT
LIABILITY UNDER RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A HELD APPLICABLE IN MARYLAND WHEN
COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT DEFENDANT
MANUFACTURED AND PLACED ON THE MARKET AN
AUTOMOBILE IN A DEFECTIVE CONDITION NOT
REASONABLY SAFE FOR ITS INTENDED USE. PHIPPS V.
GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
On September 29, 1976, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
continued the assault on the "citadel"1 that stood in opposition to
the theory of strict products liability. On that date, the court filed its
opinion in Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,2 joining Maryland with
the vast majority of jurisdictions that have adopted some form of
strict products liability in tort.3 The standard adopted in Phipps is
that stated in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
4
Neither the Restatement nor Phipps, however, answers the multitude
of questions that may arise in a case in which strict liability is
alleged, and pending further court decisions, the scope of the
doctrine remains unclear in Maryland.
This note discusses the Phipps decision, and presents an
overview of a cause of action under a strict liability theory,
emphasizing Phipps and other Maryland cases.
1. The term "citadel" relates to what was once a fortress in opposition to applying
strict liability to a seller of an allegedly defective ,product. The term was first
employed by Professor Prosser in a 1960 law review article, Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960),
and reiterated in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). When read together, these two articles
provide an in-depth historical analysis of the doctrine of strict products liability.
For further background material, see the Products Liability Symposium in the
1975 University of Baltimore Law Review. 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 1-151 (1975). See
also the brief history of strict liability in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337, 341-43, 363 A.2d 955, 957-58 (1976).
2. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
3. With Maryland's adoption of strict liability, only three states continue to resist
the deluge. They are Alabama, Delaware and Massachusetts. Puerto Rico has
also refused to espouse the doctrine. 1 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 4060 at 4036-37
(1976). Despite the fact that the CCH REPORTER includes Georgia in its chart of
states that have not adopted strict liability, the Georgia Supreme Court indicated
in Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975), that
Georgia has accepted strict products liability pursuant to GA. CODE ANN.
§ 105-106 (1968).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), adopted in Phipps at 278 Md. at
353, 363 A.2d at 963.
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I. PHIPPS V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
In 1972, James Phipps test drove an automobile which had been
brought to his employer, an automobile dealership, to undergo
servicing. The automobile had been manufactured by General
Motors Corporation. During the test drive, the accelerator pedal
stuck, resulting in Phipps' loss of control of the automobile. The car
consequently left the road and smashed into a tree, injuring Phipps.5
Phipps and his wife instituted suit against General Motors in
the Federal District Court for Maryland.6 The plaintiffs alleged that
the accelerator became stuck because of latent defects in the
automobile's accelerator mechanism, carburetor and/or motor
mounts. Two of the counts in the complaint sought to impose strict
liability in tort on the defendant for the injuries which allegedly
resulted from the latent defects. 7
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the strict liability
counts, asserting that because strict liability had not been
recognized in Maryland, those counts did not state a cause of action
under Maryland law.8 Finding a lack of controlling precedent on the
issue, the federal court certified the following question to the
Maryland Court of Appeals:9
Do the third and sixth [strict liability] counts of the
Complaint (alleging that the defendant manufactured and
placed on the market an automobile in a defective condition
which condition rendered the automobile not reasonably
safe for its intended use) state causes of action under
Maryland law by a person who allegedly sustained bodily
injuries by reason of the defective condition. 10
General Motors argued against an affirmative answer and
against the adoption of strict liability in Maryland. The defendant
contended that the warranty provisions of the Maryland Uniform
Commercial Code" adequately protected the consumer, thereby
obviating the need for strict liability. 12 Further, the defendant
5. 278 Md. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956. One of Phipps' co-workers was also in the car
and sustained injuries, but did not join in the suit. Id.
6. Id. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. 1332 (1970). Phipps' wife joined in the
suit to recover loss of consortium.
7. 278 Md. at 339, 363 A.2d at 956. The other four counts in the complaint related to
the defendant's alleged negligence and breach of express and implied warranties.
Id.
8. Id. at 339-40, 363 A.2d at 956.
9. The court of appeals is empowered to answer questions certified to it by federal
courts pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-601 (1974).
10. 278 Md. at 340, 363 A.2d at 956-57. The federal court also certified the question of
whether a spouse can recover loss of consortium by reason of an injury caused by
defendant's breach of warranty. This question was answered in the affirmative.
278 Md. at 353-56, 363 A.2d at 963-65.
11. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§2-313-315 (1975). §2-313 provides for express
warranties; § 2-314 provides for implied warranties of merchantability; and § 2-
315 provides for implied warranties that the product is fit for a particular use.
12. 278 Md. at 348, 363 A.2d at 961.
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contended that these warranty provisions constituted a legislative
preemption in the field of products liability,, and thus that strict
liability could not properly be recognized judicially. 13 Finally, the
defendant asserted that adoption of strict liability in Maryland
would "substantially alter the rights of consumers and sellers as
presently defined by the law of negligence and contract, and that the
policy reasons advanced by the courts, for altering those traditional
rights are more properly a matter of legislative rather than judicial
determination.'
14
The court of appeals disagreed and answered the certified
question affirmatively, recognizing strict liability in Maryland.
15
Judge Eldridge, writing for the court, adopted the following theory
as expressed in Section 402A:16
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller.' 7
In adopting strict liability, the court reviewed and dismissed
each contention of the defendant. The court remarked that there
were "significant differences between actions based upon contract
[that is, actions for breach of warranty] and strict liability in tort."' 8
Although both dispense with the need for privity of contract between
the plaintiff and defendant, warranty law imposes various
requirements and limitations which do not exist in an action
brought under a strict liability theory.19 The court noted that a
13. Id.
14. Id. at 349, 363 A.2d at 961.
15. Id. at 353, 363 A.2d at 963.
16. Id.
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (quoted in Phipps at 278 Md. at
341, 363 A.2d at 957.)
18. 278 Md. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962.
19. Id. at 349, 363 A.2d at 962.
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manufacturer could avoid warranty liability for a defective product
in certain situations by the use of a disclaimer; such a disclaimer
would be ineffective with respect to an action brought under Section
402A. 20 Further, although the notice requirements in an action
brought under a breach of warranty theory in Maryland had been
modified,21 the Phipps court stated that the failure to give proper
notice of a breach of warranty could still preclude an injured
plaintiff from recovering from an otherwise liable manufacturer;
strict liability in tort would involve no notice requirements. 22 Finally
the court noted the different limitations periods applicable to the two
actions.
23
The court then rejected the defendant's preemption theory on the
ground that there was no indication that the legislature had
"intended to prevent the further development of product liability law
by the courts. '24 As stated by the court in Phipps, "[i]n the absence
of any expression of intent by the Legislature to limit the remedies
available to those injured by defective goods exclusively to those
provided by the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, we believe
that the General Motors' preemption contention is without merit." 25
Finally, the court rejected the proposition that the "adoption of
strict liability would result in such a radical change of the rights of
sellers and consumers that the matter should be left to the
Legislature." 26 The court pointed out that strict liability was "really
but another form of negligence per se, in that it is a judicial
determination that placing a defective product on the market which
is unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer is itself a negligent
act sufficient to impose liability on the seller." 27 Phipps, then, was
but another of the "appropriate occasion[s]" on which the court
establishes "specific rules of conduct. ' 28
20. Id. at 349, 363 A.2d at 961-62.
21. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976). Frericks
held that a third party warranty beneficiary need not give notice of a breach of
warranty to the seller of a defective product.
22. 278 Md. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962.
23. Id. In a suit brought under a warranty theory, the governing limitations period is
four years from the time when "tender of delivery is made." MD. COM. LAw CODE
ANN. § 2-725(1), (2) (1975). In a suit brought under Section 402A, however, the
governing limitations period would likely be three years from the time the injury
occurred. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1974); Burch, A
Practitioner's Guide to the Statutes of Limitations in Product Liability Suits, 5 U.
BALT. L. REV. 23, 33-36 (1975).
Thus, if a product delivered on January 1, 1977 proved to be defective and
caused injury on January 1, 1981, the consumer would be barred from recovery
under a warranty theory, but would be able to recover under Section 402A until
December 31, 1984.
24. 278 Md. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 351, 363 A.2d at 962 (citing Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965)).
28. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965).
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"Thus," the court noted, "the theory of strict liability is not a
radical departure from traditional tort concepts. ' 29 Section 402A
continues to require some fault on the part of the manufacturer. The
seller of an allegedly defective product is not strictly liable merely
because the product proved defective and caused injury:30
Proof of a defect in the product at the time it leaves the
control of the seller implies fault on the part of the seller
sufficient to justify imposing liability for injuries caused by
the product. Where the seller supplies a defective and
unreasonably dangerous product, the seller or someone
employed by him has been at fault in designing or
constructing the product.31
The adoption of Section 402A was predicated upon the court's
belief that:
there is no reason why a party injured by a defective and
unreasonably dangerous product, which when placed on the
market is impliedly represented as safe, should bear the loss
of that injury when the seller of that product is in a better
position to take precautions and protect against the defect.
Yet this may be the result where injured parties are forced to
comply with the proof requirements of negligence actions or
are confronted with the procedural requirements and
limitations of warranty actions. 32
II. STRICT LIABILITY
In adopting the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the court
pointed out that in the cases before Phipps in which adoption of
strict liability had been urged, the court had neither accepted nor
rejected the theory.33 The court stated that it would have been
"inappropriate" to adopt strict liability in those cases because
"Section 402A was not applicable and would have afforded no
29. 278 Md. at 351, 363 A.2d at 963.
30. Id. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963.
31. Id.
32. 278 Md. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963. The court was persuaded by the justifications
for strict liability set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment c (1965) which states:
the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller,
by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming
public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does
expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods;
that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the
proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
33. Id. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960.
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additional basis of liability."3 The court then briefly reviewed four
previous cases35 in which it had been urged to accept strict liability,
but had refused to do so.
3 6
The court's analysis of prior cases to show that the doctrine had
not been rejected prior to Phipps, and its care in not overruling them,
seemingly indicates that if these cases arose subsequent to Phipps,
Section 402A would still be inappropriate and inapplicable. Since
these cases retain their precedential value, in any products liability
case subsequent to Phipps they should be utilized to determine the
scope of Section 402A liability in Maryland.
A. Types of Defects
The cases prior to Phipps will play a significant role in
determining whether Section 402A applies to various types of
defects. In any products liability action, the first step should be to
characterize the particular defect which will be alleged to have
caused the injury, and determine whether strict liability applies to
that particular category of defect. 37 Generally, there are three types
of defects - manufacturing or construction defects, design defects
and warning defects.
3 8
Manufacturing defects result from a mistaken deviation from
the manner in which the product was supposed to be manufactured
or assembled, and generally cause the product not to function as
intended and expected. While such defects are usually confined to a
small number of the manufacturer's total output of a particular
product, a design defect occurs in every one and involves no
deviation from the manner in which the product was supposed to be
made. Rather, a defectively designed product is made as intended
and may function as intended, and yet create an unreasonable risk
of injury,39 as in the case of a manufacturer's failure to incorporate a
safety feature. Warning defects result from the seller's failure to
warn or instruct the user with respect to potential danger in the use
34. Id.
35. The four cases cited by the court are: Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md.
288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d
737 (1974); Myers v.\Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969);
Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968).
36. 278 Md. at 346-48, 363 A.2d at 960-61. The Phipps court neglected to cite or
review Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972), in which the issue of
strict liability was argued before the court and the court similarly found that
Section 402A was not "appropriate" or "applicable" in that case.
37. See Vetri, Products Liability: The Prima Facie Case, 11 ABA INSURANCE,
NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION LAw SECTION, THE FORUM 1117 (1976).
38. Id. at 1118.
39. See Volkswagen of America v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 214-20, 321 A.2d 737, 745-47
(1974); Note, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and its
Aftermath, 118 U. OF PA. L. REv. 299 (1970).
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of a product which may be neither defectively made nor defectively
designed.4
0
With respect to manufacturing defects, those jurisdictions which
have adopted Section 402A uniformly hold that it applies to any
defect caused by faulty manufacturing or assembly or by some
foreign ingredient or impurity.41 As noted by the court in .Phipps,
"where the defect is a result of an error in the manufacturing
process, that is where the product is in a condition not intended by
the seller, there is less difficulty in applying the defectiveness test of
of § 402A."' 42 Presumably, the Court of Appeals of Maryland would
hold Section 402A similarly applicable in manufacturing defect
cases.
There is a split among jurisdictions, however, as to whether
Section 402A applies to design defects. 43 Generally, the courts that
refuse to impose strict liability for defective design reason that a
manufacturer's liability for unsafe design is founded primarily upon
a failure to meet proper standards of care in that industry, which
properly falls within a negligence analysis.44 Some courts purport to
recognize strict liability for defective design, but require as a
prerequisite to recovery under Section 402A proof that the
manufacturer failed to adhere to a standard of care exercised by the
"reasonable man" in the industry. 45 This is, of course, tantamount to
a negligence standard.
The court in Phipps recognized that when the product is
allegedly defective due to design, Section 402A is not so easily
applied.46 The court found, however, that there are "those kinds of
conditions which, whether caused by design or manufacture, can
never be said to involve a reasonable risk."47 The examples given by
40. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 239 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
42. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959.
43. Compare Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970) with Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See
generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIIIuTY § 16A [4][eI at 3-
327 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN]; 72 C.J.S. Supp. Products
Liability § 20 at 30-31 (1975).
44. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying
Minnesota law).
45. See, e.g., Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973).
46. 278 Md. at 344-45, 363 A.2d at 959. The court took note of authorities that have
refused to apply Section 402A to design defects, and instead applied traditional
standards of negligence. The court then gave the reasoning of these authorities
for not applying strict liability:
The reasoning of these authorities is that in a design defect case the
standard of defectiveness under § 402A, involving as it does the element
of unreasonable danger, still requires a weighing of the utility of risk
inherent in the design against the magnitude of the risk.
Id. at 345, 363 A.2d at 959.
47. Id. at 345, 363 A.2d at 959.
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the court of such conditions to which strict liability should apply,
regardless of whether the defect was in manufacturing or design,
were a new automobile swerving off the road due to a faulty steering
mechanism; 48 separation of a new automobile's drive shaft when the
automobile is being driven in a normal manner;
49 brake failure;50
and the defect in Phipps, the sticking of an automobile's
accelerator.51
Phipps, thus, seemingly stands for the proposition that Section
402A applies in cases in which the product malfunctions, regardless
of the nature of the defect. Phipps leaves unanswered the question
whether Section 402A would apply in a case in which the product
functions as intended but nevertheless causes injury.
There is Maryland authority, however, for the proposition that
Section 402A does not apply to design defects if the product
functions in the manner intended. In Volkswagen of America v.
Young,52 one of the questions certified to the Maryland Court of
Appeals by the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia was whether, under Maryland law, a manufacturer may
be strictly liable for failure to design a "crashworthy" vehicle. 53 The
plaintiffs had alleged that the driver seat assembly and interior of
the decedent's Volkswagon had been so designed as to create an
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.54 The court of
appeals held that Section 402A was inapplicable, but that a
manufacturer might be liable in such a case under "traditional
principles of negligence" 55 for a departure from proper standards of
care which enhance the risk of injury should an accident occur.
56
Although Judge Eldridge, who also wrote the Phipps opinion,
broadly declared in Young that "[Section 402A] has no proper
application to liability for design defects in motor vehicles, ' 57 the
combined effect of the two opinions is to limit Young to holding
Section 402A inapplicable to design defects that do not cause the
product to malfunction.
48. Id. (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960)).
49. 278 Md. at 345, 363 A.2d at 959 (citing Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.
2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969)).
50. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959 (citing Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968)).
51. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959.
52. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
53. Id. at 203-04, 321 A.2d at 738. The design defect alleged in a case such as Young
is that the automobile was designed in such a manner as to increase or enhance
the injury resulting from a collision. This type of case is also known as a "second
collision" case. Id. at 207, 321 A.2d at 740. The primary difference between this
type of case and other design defect cases is that in the former, "the defect is not
the cause of the initial impact." Id.
54. Id. at 205, 321 A.2d at 739.
55. Id. at 221, 321 A.2d at 747-48.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 220-21, 321 A.2d at 747.
302 [Vol. 6
Recent Decisions
Further, in Myers v. Montgomery Ward _& Co.,5 8 the court of
appeals refused to apply Section 402A when the absence of safety
features resulted in injury. The plaintiff fell and was injured when
his foot was caught in the whirling blades of a lawn mower sold and
manufactured by the defendants. The plaintiff had alleged, inter
alia, that the defendants were strictly liable for their failure to
adequately protect against danger from the mower's blades. 59 In
affirming the trial court's sustaining of the defendants' demurrer,
the court distinguished a California case60 which had applied strict
liability to defective design, by noting that in the California case, the
machinery had malfunctioned.
61
Thus, in Maryland, Section 402A would seem to apply to
manufacturing or construction defects and design defects which
cause products to malfunction, but may not apply to other types of
design defects.
62
Phipps did not discuss warning defects. Prior to Phipps,
however, manufacturers had been subjected to liability in negligence
for warning defects. 63 Most jurisdictions that have adopted strict
liability have extended its coverage to warning defects. 64 Maryland's
position on this matter remains to be determined.
B. Elements of a Section 402A Cause of Action
Once the defect is characterized and it is determined that
Section 402A may apply, the facts of the case must then be analyzed
to determine whether the elements of a cause of action in strict
liability can be proven.
To establish a cause of action under Section 402A, the plaintiff
must prove that:
58. 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969).
59. Id. at 287, 252 A.2d at 858-59.
60. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
61. 253 Md. at 297, 252 A.2d at 864.
62. But see Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974), which is
representative of those cases that make no distinction between design and
manufacturing defects with respect to the applicability of Section 402A. As noted
by the Idaho court, "[tihe risk to the user will be just as great with an
unreasonably dangerous design defect as with a manufacturing defect." Id. at
762, 519 P.2d at 428.
Whether Section 402A applies to all, some or no design defects may be
entirely academic. As noted by one court:
'[Tlhe distinction between the so-called strict liability principle and
negligence is of no practical significance so far as the standard of
conduct required of the defendant is concerned. In either event, the
standard required is reasonable care [in design].'
Garrison v. Rohm and Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974) (quoting Jones
v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973)). The Maryland Court
of Appeals recognized this principle in Young, 272 Md. at 221, 321 A.2d at 747.
63. E.g., Moran v. Faberg6, 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
64. Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 239, 243 (1973).
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1. The defendant is the seller of a product
2. in a defective condition
3. unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
4. when it leaves the seller's possession or control
5. which causes the plaintiffs injury
6. and has reached the consumer without substantial change in
its condition.
65
1. Seller of a product
One element not discussed in Phipps is that the defendant must
be a seller of the allegedly defective product.66 The word "seller"
generally encompasses defendants other than retailers who actually
put products in the hands of consumers. Wholesalers, 67 manufactur-
ers,68 makers of component parts69 and importers70 have been
included within the definition of a seller. Section 402A's requirement
of a seller has also been extended to the builder, 71 seller 72 and
financer 73 of a new home. It has generally been held, however, that
repairers, 74 those providing services with products that prove to be
defective, 75 general endorsers who make no representation that they
65. The six elements listed are taken from the Restatement. The Phipps court listed
four elements:
For a recovery [under Section 402A], it must be established that (1) the
product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the possession
or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause of the injuries, and (4) that
the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without
substantial change in its condition.
278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965). Comment f states,
however; that strict liability would not apply to an "occasional seller." One
example of an "occasional seller" is an automobile owner who "on one occasion
sells it to his neighbor, or even to a dealer in used cars . . . even though [the
former owner] is fully aware that the dealer plans to resell it." Id. In Balido v.
Improved Machine Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973), the
defendant company sold a plastic press it had been using in its plant. The
machine proved to be defective due to a lack of a safety device. The court ruled in
the defendant's favor, holding that the defendant was at most an occasional
seller and not liable under Section 402A.
67. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684
(1967).
68. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
69. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969).
70. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
71. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
72. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
73. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 887, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
74. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975).
75. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967). For a general
overview, see Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970).
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have tested the product 76 and design engineers 77 are not sellers
within the meaning of Section 402A.
There has been some conflict as to whether the lessor of a
defective product is a seller within Section 402A's meaning. 78 The
majority view is that a lessor may be liable under Section 402A. 79
One of the leading cases in this area is Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing and Rental Service,80 in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court reasoned:
A bailor for hire, such as a person in the U-drive-it business,
puts motor vehicles in the stream of commerce in a fashion
not unlike a manufacturer or retailer. In fact such a bailor
puts the vehicle he buys and then rents to the public to more
sustained use on the highways than most ordinary car
purchasers. The very nature of the business is such that the
bailee, his employees, passengers and the traveling public
are exposed to a greater quantum of potential danger of
harm from defective vehicles than usually arises out of sales
by the manufacturer. We [have held that] the liability of the
manufacturer might be expressed in terms of strict liability
in tort . . . By analogy the same rule should be made
applicable to the U-drive-it bailor-bailee relationship. Such a
rental must be regarded as accompanied by a representation
that the vehicle is fit for operation on the public highways.
... Accordingly, we are of the opinion. . . that the nature
of the U-drive-it business is such that the responsibility of
Hertz may properly be stated in terms of strict liability in
tort.8'
Despite the seemingly sound reasoning exemplified in cases
such as Cintrone, there is authority in Maryland to the contrary,
holding that a defect in a leased product does not give rise to a cause
of action under Section 402A because there has been no sale of a
product. In Bona v. Graefe, 2 the plaintiff was injured due to the
brake failure of a leased golf cart. The court refused to adopt Section
402A, ruling that the Section was not intended to cover leased
product situations. Instead, the proper cause of action against a
lessor would be in negligence.8 3 Although this case was not
mentioned in Phipps, it should still limit the scope of Section 402A in
76. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1972). For a
general overview, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 181 (1971).
77. LaRosa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Note,
Liability of Design Professionals: The Necessity of Fault, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1221
(1973).
78. See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, § 16A [4] [iii] at 3-277.
79. Id.
80. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
81. Id. at 449, 212 A.2d at 777-79.
82. 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
83. Id. at 77-78, 285 A.2d at 611.
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Maryland because of the Phipps court's care in not overruling
previous decisions.8
4
Another point of conflict as to the applicability of Section 402A
is whether a "seller" includes the seller of a used product. There is no
Maryland authority on this point, and other jurisdictions are split on
the issue.8 5 In the case of Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chev. Co., 8 the
Illinois Supreme Court overturned an intermediate appellate court's
determination that Section 402A applied to the seller of a used car.
The court found that there was no allegation that the defendant used
car dealer created the risk of injury,87 and ruled that there was "no
need to place an absolute duty on a used car dealer to find all
discoverable defects."
88
Generally, courts that take a more liberal view hold that one
who places an item in the stream of commerce is a seller within the
meaning of Section 402A. 8
9
2. Defective condition
In defining this element of Section 402A, the Phipps court relied
on the official comments to the Restatement and stated, "the
requirement of a defective condition limits application of § 402A to
those situations where 'the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."' 90
In determining whether a product is defective, 91 other courts
have generally employed one of two objective standards. 92 Under one
test, which has its roots in the Uniform Commercial Code, the court
views the product to see if it is reasonably fit for its intended use. 93
84. See text accompanying notes 33-36, supra.
85. Compare Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chev. Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975);
Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185 (1975) with Hovenden v. Tenbush,
529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1975). For a general overview, see Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 8
(1972).
86. 61 111. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
87. Id. at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
88. Id. See also Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185 (1975), in which the
court recognized that application of Section 402A to the used products industry
would deal a severe economic blow to that business. The court noted that a buyer
of a used product should recognize that it will not be of the same quality as a new
one.
89. In Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds 423 U.S. 3 (1975), the defendant contended that there was no sale
because it had merely assembled the product according to the specifications
supplied by the United States Army. Applying Texas law, the court held, "Itihe
[product] in this case came into commerce via a commercial transaction....
This is all that is necessary for the attachment of strict liability under Texas
law." 512 F.2d at 82.
90. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A Comment g (1965)).
In 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at § 16A[4][e] at 3-306, this
element is defined as, "that condition which renders the product inadequate, and
which in turn leads to liability on the part of its seller or manufacturer."
91. See, e.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969).
92. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at § 16A[4][e] at 3-320-320.1.
93. See, e.g., Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974).
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Under the other test, which emerges from the Restatement itself and
was apparently adopted in Phipps,94 the court views the product to
determine if it is in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer and unreasonably dangerous to him. As noted by one
commentator, "[u]sing either phraseology, if a product in an
unintended condition because of a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process is involved, the product would be classified as defective." 95
As further noted by that commentator, "if it is shown that the
product was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was
manufactured, it would also be unreasonably dangerous.. ,,96
As discussed above, some courts have held that the defective
condition element is not met in the case of an alleged defective
design. Apparently this is also the law in Maryland with respect to
design defects which do not cause a product to malfunction.97 A
warning defect is proved if the injury is or should have been
foreseeable and the product lacks an appropriate warning, even
though the product is properly made and designed. 98
Regardless of which type of defect is involved, the plaintiff in a
strict liability action may rely on expert testimony to prove the
existence of a defect.99 Such proof is not mandatory, however, and a
defect may be established circumstantially. 100 Practices by others in
the industry are generally admissible on the issue of whether a
defect exists, 10 as are subsequent changes in design of the
product.1
02
3. Unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
The Restatement defines unreasonably dangerous as follows:
"An unreasonably dangerous product ... [is] one which is
'dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.' "103
94. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959.
95. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at § 16A[4][e] at 3-320-320.1 (emphasis
added).
96. Id. at 3-321. See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 8 (1973).
97. See text accompanying notes 46-62, supra.
98. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at § 16A[41[e] at 3-334.6-3-334.7.
99. See, e.g., Waller v. Fort Dodge Laboratories, 356 F. Supp. 413 (E.D.Mo. 1972).
100. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.
1972).
101. E.g., Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J.Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970).
102. E.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1974).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment i (1965) (quoted in Phipps at
278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959).
Phipps clearly establishes that the requirement under Section 402A that a
defective product be unreasonably dangerous is an element of a cause of action.
A minority of jurisidictions, however, have eliminated the concept of "unreasona-
ble danger" from Section 402A cases. E.g., Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123
N.J.Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at
§ 16A[4][e] at 3-333-334.6.
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Although some courts combine this element with the requirement
that there be a defect,10 4 Phipps lists it as a separate and distinct
element.105
The determination of whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous generally depends on the facts of the particular case.
10 6
There are, however, general considerations which the courts employ
in making this determination and, "in the final analysis, the
determination depends upon considerations of public policy, and on
balance the utility of the product must be weighed against the
magnitude of the danger."'1 7 More specifically, the courts look to:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the
availability of other and safer products to meet the same
need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable serious-
ness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common
knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger
(particularly for established products), (6) avoidability of
injury by care in use of the product (including the effect of
instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability to eliminate the
danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the
product or making it unduly expensive.108
Prior to Phipps, the Maryland courts rigidly adhered to the rule
that if the danger is patent'0 9 or should be known to the user," 0 there
can be no liability for resulting injury either under Section 402A"' or
in negligence" 2 because the product is not unreasonably dangerous.
Thus, in such cases after Phipps, Section 402A should not apply.
4. When the product leaves the seller's possession or control
When the plaintiff has shown that the product contains a defect
and is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user, he has not
104. E.g., Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969).
105. 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958.
106. E.g., Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J.Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62
(1975).
107. 72 C.J.S. Supp. Products Liability § 13 at 21 (1975). See also Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 419 U.S. 869
(1974).
108. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.L.J. 5, 17 (1965) (cited in
Phipps at 278 Md. 345 n.4, 363 A.2d at959 n.4). See generally Annot., 54
A.L.R.3d 352 (1973).
109. Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 368-70, 283 A.2d 567, 569-70 (1971);
Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 245-46, 257 A.2d 430, 432
(1969); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 292-95, 235 A.2d 855, 861-
63 (1969).
110. Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968); Katz v. Arundel-Brooks
Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959).
111. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969); Telak v.
Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968).
112. Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Blankenship v.
Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969); Katz v. Arundel-Brooks
Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151'A.2d 731 (1959).
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yet made out a prima facie case. Although the defendant's
negligence, or lack thereof, is not relevant in a strict liability
action, 113 the defect in the product must still be traced to the
defendant.' 14 The seller is not the consumer's insurer, and the failure
of a product to perform properly does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to recover.1 5 Thus, Section 402A does not entirely eliminate
the concept of fault. As noted by the court in Phipps, "[p]roof of a
defect in the product at the time it leaves the control of the seller
implies fault on the part of the seller sufficient to justify imposing
liability for injuries caused by the product." 1 6 As a general rule, if
the plaintiff fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defect existed when the product left the seller's control, liability
will not attach to that seller.117 As a corollary to this rule, if the
product has been used over a period of time, the plaintiff will have a
more difficult time showing that the defect existed when it left the
seller's control, rather than being the result of ordinary use or
wear.118
5. Causation of plaintiffs injury
Once the product is proved defective, the plaintiff must still
prove that the defect proximately caused the injuries.11 9 It has been
held that the defect need not be the only cause and that it is
sufficient if it causes injury in combination with other factors.120 If
the other factors predominate, however, the plaintiff cannot rec-
over. 121
The burden of proving causation may be met by showing
sufficient facts to permit the jury to infer that the defect was a
113. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958.
114. E.g., Hall v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
See also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, § 16A[41[e] at 3-304-306.
115. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). There is authority
holding that once the product is shown by the plaintiff to be defective, the burden
of proving who caused the defect shifts to the defendant. Curtiss v. Young Men's
Christian Ass'n, 7 Wash. App. 451, 99 P.2d 915 (1972), aff'd 82 Wash. 2d 455, 511
P.2d 991 (1973).
116. 278 Md. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963.
117. Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1972); Bates v. Werner Co.,
419 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1970); Southwire Co. v. Beloitt Eastern Corp., 370 F. Supp.
845 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Morrison v. Trailmobile Trailers, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 822 (Ky.
App. 1975); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975);
General Motors Corp. v. Franks, 509 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
118. Rockett v. General Motors Corp., 31 Ill. App. 3d 217,-334 N.E.2d 764 (1975).
119. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958. See also Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
120. Vlahovich v. Betts Machine Co., 101 Ill.App. 2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17 (1968), aff'd
45 Ill. 2d 506, 260 N.E.2d 230 (1970).
121. See Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969) (injuries
from lawn mower blades caused primarily by plaintiffs fall and not the product).
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substantial cause of the injury. 122 Expert evidence may also be used
to show causation.
1 23
The defendant may be able to prove the lack of causation (or the
lack of a defect) by showing that the plaintiffs misuse of the product
caused the injury.12 4 If the plaintiffs misuse was reasonably
foreseeable, however, strict liability may still be imposed upon the
seller. 25 Although such misuse. smacks of contributory negligence,
which Section 402A eliminates as a defense, 26 the case law in this
area is firm in denying recovery when a plaintiff has unforeseeably
misused the defendant's product.
127
6. Substantial change in its condition
The sixth element of a Section 402A cause of action is that the
product reached the consumer without any substantial change in its
condition. 128 As noted by the court in Phipps, Section 402A was not
applicable in a previous Maryland case 129 when there was a
"subsequent mishandling or alteration [which] render[ed] an
otherwise safe product unsafe."' 130 If the defendant can prove that
the product alleged to have caused the injury was modified or
changed after it left his control, plaintiffs recovery would be barred
under a strict liability theory.13 ' The defendant will not escape strict
liability, however, if the subsequent alteration or mishandling did
not cause the product to become defective. 32
122. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975). See also 2
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at § 16A[4][e] at 3-310.
123. It is not unusual to employ the same expert evidence to prove that the product
was in a defective condition and that it caused the plaintiffs injury. See Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1085 (1967).
124. See, e.g., McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974). See
also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, § 16A[4][d] at 3-299.
125. Cronin v. J.B.E.Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment n (1965).
127. See, e.g., Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied
380 U.S. 951 (1965). See also 63 AM. JuR. 2d Products Liability § 136 at 143-45
(1972).
128. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958. This
requirement is closely related to the fourth requirement discussed in text
accompanying notes 113-18, supra.
129. Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968). In Telak, the plaintiff
was injured when he dived off a diving board which had not been sold by the
defendant who sold the pool.
130. 278 Md. at 347, 363 A.2d at 960 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
Comment g (1965)). See also Santiago v. Package Machinery Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d
305, 260 N.E.2d 89 (1970) (manufacturer could avoid liability when the defect was
caused by another's negligence in making repairs).
131. See O.S.Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968). It should be
noted, however, that a manufacturer cannot delegate its duty to produce a safe
product, and if the source of the defect is the failure of a party further down the
distribution chain to perform an act in preparing the product for sale, the
manufacturer will still be strictly liable. Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App.
2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964).
132. See, e.g., Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F. Supp. 901 (W.D.Pa. 1971), aff'd 471
F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973).
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C. Damages Covered by Section 402A
In Phipps the plaintiffs sought and, if successful on the merits,
could recover damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium.
In addition to recovery for personal injuries, 133 the Restatement also
allows for recovery of damages inflicted by injury to or loss of
property.1 34 This would also include loss or damage to the product
itself.135 As to whether a party can recover for economic or
commercial losses, the courts are split, with the majority refusing to
extend strict liability to such losses if there are no personal
injuries.136
D. Defenses to a Strict Liability Action
Affirmative defenses based on the conduct of the plaintiff are
briefly reviewed in the comments to Section 402A.137 As noted by the
court in Phipps:
Under § 402A, various defenses are still available to the
seller in an action based on strict liability in tort. These
defenses are set forth and explained in the official comments
following § 402A. For example, the seller is not liable where
injury results from abnormal handling or use of the product
(Comment h), where mishandling or alteration after delivery
of the product renders it unsafe (Comment g), or if warnings
or instructions supplied with the product are disregarded by
the consumer where, if used in accordance with these
warnings, the product would be safe (Comment j). Addition-
ally, where the plaintiff unreasonably proceeds to use a
product despite a known risk or danger, the defense of
assumption of the risk is still available (Comment n). 138
Lack of privity of contract,139 lack of notice of a claim 140 and a
manufacturer's disclaimer 14' are not defenses to a Section 402A
cause of action. Further, contributory negligence of the plaintiff in
failing to discover a defect or to guard against its existence is not a
defense to a strict liability action. 42
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
136. Compare Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965) with Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). For a
general discussion, see Note, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturer for "Economic
Loss," 7 BOST. COLLEGE IND. & COMM. L. REv. 767 (1966).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comments g, h, i, j, k and n (1965).
138. 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959-60.
139. See, e.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
140. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
141. Id.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment n (1965).
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Limitations remains a defense to a strict liability action for a
defective product. 143 Although some jurisdictions apply the four-year
period provided for in the Uniform Commercial Code, 144 Maryland,
following the majority of jurisdictions, applies the three-year period
also applicable in negligence actions.
145
III. CONCLUSION
With the advent of strict liability in Maryland, consumers in this
state are further protected against injuries which result from the use
of defective products. The difficulty that exists in proving a
manufacturer's or seller's negligence, and the difficulties presented
in bringing an action for a breach of warranty, can now be avoided,
allowing recovery from a party who might otherwise escape liability.
In one sense, strict liability is a misnomer, because Section 402A
still requires that there be some fault on a defendant's part. In a
negligence action, a plaintiff must prove this fault by showing some
act or omission to act on the defendant's part that departs from a
recognized standard of care. Phipps and Section 402A eliminate
proof of the act, and provide instead that a seller is sufficiently at
fault if he places a defective product in the stream of commerce. Most
cases brought under Section 402A will focus on the product.
Phipps and Section 402A place a greater responsibility on those
who supply and sell the goods bought and used by the otherwise
innocent public. Hopefully, Phipps will cause those involved in each
step of the chain of distribution to exercise greater care before
releasing goods into the market place.
The scope of strict liability coverage in Maryland remains, as of
this date, somewhat unclear. Since 1962, when the California
Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.146 made
that state the first to adopt the theory, 147 the doctrine of strict
liability has evolved into a well defined body of law. Each
jurisdiction, however, has molded the theory to fit what it believes
the law should be. With Phipps and the prior Maryland cases in
which strict liability was alleged, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has outlined the boundaries of a new theory of law by which injured
consumers may be protected against defective products. At present,
Maryland consumers now possess a theory, the substance of which
awaits elucidation by the courts in decisions subsequent to Phipps v.
General Motors Corp.148
Gerson B. Mehlman
143. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43 § 16A[5j[g] at 3-366, 4-70.
144. Id.
145. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962.
146. 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
147. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, § 16A[1] at 3-237.
148. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
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